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Abstract 
 
The international climate regime is in the process of negotiating a legally binding 
instrument concerning Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD+).  The article starts by exploring the complex web of decisions and advices 
that currently regulate REDD+ initiatives within the international climate regime.  
This is followed by an analysis of justice issues raised by non-state actors in the 
REDD+ international negotiations.  The article concludes by building on this analysis 
to identify some relevant considerations when seeking to design a just legally binding 
REDD+ instrument.  These consideration include: the impact of market versus fund 
based investment channels, the importance of defining a clear objective; the inclusion 
and role of international principles such as sovereignty, preventative action, common 
but differentiated responsibility, sustainable development and Free Prior and 
Informed Consent; the appropriate design of REDD+ safeguards and the inclusion of 
grievance mechanisms within the instrument which provide guidance on resolving 
disputes associated with REDD+ investment. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The role of forests as both sinks and sources of emissions has become an issue of 
interest to the international climate regime.1 Interest in the sequestration capacity of 
forests has resulted in the development of the REDD+ initiative within the 
international climate regime. Activities implemented under the REDD+ banner seek 
to preserve or increase terrestrial carbon storage in developing countries.2 There are 
concerns from a wide range of stakeholders that unintended consequences might arise 
from REDD+ investment and some of these concerns have been framed using a 
justice lens. Adverse impacts are anticipated as a number of REDD+ initiatives are 
occurring in areas with histories of land use conflicts and or insecure/disputed tenure 
																																																								
*	Rowena Maguire, Senior Lecturer, Law School, Queensland University of Technology, Australia. 
The author would like to acknowledge the valuable feedback from the anonymous reviewers. 	
1 The term climate regime is used in this article to refer to the governance arrangements that exist to 
support the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.   
2 Gert JAN NABUURS and others, “Forestry” in Bert Metz and others, eds, Climate Change 2007: 
Mitigation- Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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arrangements. There are also concerns that communities who engage in REDD+ 
activities will not be the primary beneficiaries of REDD+ investment. Indigenous 
People, communities living in forests, women and the poor are groups that have been 
identified as being particularly vulnerable in the REDD+ context.  Given that State 
parties are still negotiating the form, nature and substance that a legally binding 
REDD+ instrument should adopt, it seems appropriate to identify and discuss the 
justice concerns being raised by non-state actors, before suggesting key elements for a 
legally binding instrument.  
 
Issues of justice associated with REDD+ investment arise at the international, 
national and sub-national levels.3  The focus of this article is on the use of justice 
language or a justice lens within the REDD+ dialogue at the international level.  This 
article starts by providing an overview of the international climate regime decisions 
and advices concerning REDD+ and explaining how the initiative has incrementally 
emerged over a series of international climate negotiations.  One of the 
underdeveloped aspects of the initiative is specific safeguard policies and it is likely 
that most of the justice issues raised in this paper will in part be addressed by 
safeguard policy once developed.   
The next section of the article explores the linkages between the language and 
frame of justice within international environmental regulation.  It shows that there is 
little consistency of consensus upon both the definition and or theories of justice that 
operate in this space as well as to the precise nature of the justice issues raised by 
REDD+.  The article suggests that a range of justice theories, right-based paradigms 
and social movement perspectives, are useful in identifying areas of injustice in 
respect of REDD+.  This article explores how non-state actor movements such as the 
Climate Justice Movement, the Third World Network and the Indigenous Network 
have framed their submissions on REDD+ and how the language of justice has been 
embodied within these submissions.  Issues raised by these non-state actors include 
considerations such as to the appropriate financial mechanism to transfer REDD+ 
funds (market versus fund approach); the appropriate manner in which to share 
benefits arising from REDD+ investment (existing channels or carbon rights), the 
potential impact of REDD+ investment on Indigenous and local forest communities 
and the failure of existing safeguard policies to include the principle of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (a fundamental international human rights principle).    
The article concludes by looking at the ingredients required for a just and legally 
binding REDD+ instrument. Such analysis looks at the nature and form options for a 
future agreement, the need for a clear objective, existing international environmental 
principles that should be included and the need for the establishment of dispute 
resolution machinery within the agreement. 
																																																								
3 Thomas SIKOR, “REDD-Plus, Forest People’s Rights and Nested Climate Governance” (2010) 20 
Global Environmental Change 423 and Thomas SIKOR, “Forest Justice: Towards a New Agenda for 
Research and Practice” (2010) 7 Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences 245. 
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I. REDD+ POLICY AND PRACTICE 
A. REDD+ Policy Development within the UNFCCC 
The aim of the REDD+ initiative is to reduce emissions from deforestation and land 
degradation in developing countries. The initiative has provided and will continue to 
provide financial incentives to states that alter existing forest practices. REDD+ has 
generated unprecedented levels of finance at the international level for improved 
forest governance and management and has thus far surpassed previous international 
funds for forest related governance.4 The activities encouraged by the initiative are 
avoiding deforestation and degradation; conservation, sustainable management of 
forests; and the enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries.5 As the 
REDD+ initiative is occurring under the auspice of the international climate change 
regime, a key focus of the policy is to protect carbon values associated with forest 
areas. The + in the acronym represents the additional activities beyond the avoidance 
of deforestation and degradation. In addition, the REDD+ initiative seeks to ensure 
that environmental and social considerations are part of all REDD+ activities. As 
such, REDD+ initiatives are tasked with ensuring that they deliver on carbon, 
ecological and social objectives. Questions have arisen over the ability of a single 
mechanism to deliver triple win scenarios, as carbon sequestration activities do not 
necessarily align with the promotion of other co-benefits such as livelihood or 
ecological improvements. Despite such reservations, there is general support for the 
mechanism as it seeks to create financial incentives for people in developing countries 
to conserve or improve forest and land management. The initiative is based on the 
premise that unsustainable forest and land management activities can be altered, if 
sufficient financial, technical and regulatory support is provided.   
The REDD+ policy has evolved from a number of Conference of the Parties (COP) 
decisions by parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Article 7.2 of the UNFCCC gives the COP general authority to examine 
the obligations of the parties in light of the objective of the Convention and to make 
decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. The 
powers in article 7.2 stop short of providing the COP with authority to establish new 
legal commitments.6 Bodansky suggests that new and additional commitments require 
the development of new legal instruments, which could occur by way of example as 
an amendment of the UNFCCC, or the creation of a new protocol. The Legal 
Response Unit agrees with Bodansky and concludes generally that COP decisions    
																																																								
4 Collaborative Partnership on Forests, “2012 Study on Forest Financing” (2012), online: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/AGF_Study_July_2012.pdf>. 
5 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008, para. graph 1 (b) (iii). 
6 Daniel BODANSKY, “Legal Form of a New Climate Agreement: Avenues and Options” PEW 
Center on Global Climate Change (2009), online: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 
<http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-form-of-new-climate-agreement-paper.pdf> and Legal 
Response Unit, “COP Decisions: Substance and Mandates” (4 October 2010), online: Legal Response 
Iniative <http://www.legalresponseinitiative.org/download/BP25E%20-%20Briefing%20Paper%20-
%20COP%20Decisions%20-%20Substance%20and%20Mandates.pdf>. 
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“on issues of substance, to the extent they introduce new obligations or change existing 
obligations, would not be legally-binding unless there is a treaty provision which grants the 
COP the authority to make decisions in respect of those issues. In the absence of such grants of 
authority, the COP decisions will remain as political statements of intent until such time as the 
provisions of the decisions are incorporated into a new or existing treaty.7” 
 
The REDD+ obligations specified within the various COP decisions are therefore 
non-legally binding in nature. REDD+ is referred to as a mechanism within the COP 
decisions, in other words a work in progress.8 In addition to uncertainty surrounding 
the future of a legally binding REDD+ instrument, there is a large degree of 
uncertainty surrounding a range of other issues connected with REDD+. Such issues 
include: benefit sharing, monitoring of carbon reductions and scaling up finance and 
investment. The COP decisions reached thus far on REDD+ have served a practical 
purpose in informing the work of institutions implementing REDD+ pilot projects. 
Such bodies have sought to comply with the obligations specified in COP decisions 
on the basis that the COP language will inform the development of future REDD+ 
instruments. These REDD+ implementing bodies are seeking to ensure pre 
compliance with the future legally binding REDD+ instrument.    
The REDD+ concept was first discussed in 2005 COP negotiations in Montreal. 
Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, along with support from seven other countries: 
Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Dominic Republic and Nicaragua submitted a proposal entitled “Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action”.9 The 
submission made a compelling case as to why emissions from deforestation should be 
included within the international carbon framework. It highlighted that land use 
emissions accounted for 10-25% of all global human induced emissions and that 
developing nations currently had no way of engaging with the Kyoto Protocol for 
emission reductions generated from reduced deforestation rates. The submission 
argued that the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC found in article 2, requiring 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” will be 
made more difficult and expensive unless both industrial and developing countries 
actively contribute to emission reductions from all sources. The submission received 
broad support and the COP decision directed the Subsidiary Body of Scientific and 
Technical Advice (SBSTA) to prepare a report considering the methodological issues 
preventing the development of REDD+ policy. 
																																																								
7 Legal Response Unit, “COP Decisions: Substance and Mandates” (4 October 2010), online: Legal 
Response Initiative <http://www.legalresponseinitiative.org/download/BP25E%20-
%20Briefing%20Paper%20-%20COP%20Decisions%20-%20Substance%20and%20Mandates.pdf>. 
8 Annalisa SAVARESI, “The Human Rights Dimension of REDD” (2012) 21 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 102 at 103.   
9 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries: Approaches to 
Stimulate Action, FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, 11 November 2005.  
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Article 9 of the UNFCCC creates the SBSTA, which is required to provide the 
COP with guidance on: scientific assessments, scientific advice, innovative and 
efficient technologies and relevant technological and methodological guidance. The 
SBSTA group has had REDD+ on its agenda from 2005 and has been making 
incremental progress in defining the requirements and terms of the mechanism. The 
first workshop held by the SBSTA on REDD+ was convened to discuss the following 
three issues:  
 
1. Scientific, socio-economic, technical and methodological issues including the 
role of forests in the global carbon cycles, definitional issues (deforestation, 
degradation), data availability and quality, scale, rates and drivers of 
deforestation, estimate of changes in carbon stocks and forest cover and related 
uncertainties.  
2. Policy approaches and positive incentives to reduce emissions from 
deforestation in developing countries, including causes short and long term 
effectiveness with respect to emission reductions, the displacement of 
emissions, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, activities of other relevant 
international bodies, enhancing sustainable forest management, capacity-
building, financial mechanisms and other alternatives. 
3. Identification of possible links between relevant scientific, socio-economic 
technical and methodological issues and policy approaches and positive 
incentives that may arise from the consideration of the topics above.10  
 
Some progress has been made in addressing these three broad categories, but 
neither the SBSTA nor COP decisions have addressed all of these issues conclusively. 
Early REDD+ negotiations proceeded rapidly, as a result of rare convergence of 
opinion concerning REDD+ among state parties to the UNFCCC. The COP 
negotiations in 2012 at Doha however slowed the trend of rapid REDD+ development 
with issues such as verification, payment method, inclusion of non-carbon benefits 
and implementation of safeguards proving to be sticking points for the parties.11 Table 
1 below lists the main contributions of the SBSTA group to the development of 
REDD+ policy.   
 
Table 1: REDD OUTCOMES: SBSTA Sessions 24-35 
 
Session Location/Year Outcome/Contribution 
24 18-26 May 2006 
Bonn 
Background paper on REDD+ developed—released in 
preparation for First REDD+ Workshop.  
																																																								
10 UNFCCC Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, 30 
August—1 September 2006,hosted by FAO, Rome, Italy.  
11Catriona MOSS and Michelle KOVACEVIC, “The Honeymoon for REDD+ is Over: consensus not 
yet reached in Doha on MRV, finance” Center for International Forestry Research (4 December 
2012), online: Centre for International Forestry Research <http://blog.cifor.org/12941/the-honeymoon-
for-redd-is-over-consensus-not-yet-reached-in-doha-on-mrv-finance/#.UOrtke0rxFJ>. 
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25 6 - 14 Nov 2006 
Nairobi 
Background paper developed for Second REDD+ 
Workshop. 
Issues considered included: policy approaches, 
incentives, technical and methodological requirements, 
assessment of results and reliability. 
Consideration of CBD, UNCCD, Ramsar instruments 
and work of UNFF, ITTO and WTO in dealing with 
forest issues.  
26 7-18 May 2007 
Bonn 
Started preparing draft text on REDD+ for COP 
negotiations.  
27 3-11 Dec 2007 
Bali 
Completed draft text on REDD+12 
Policy Approaches and positive incentives not dealt 
with in draft text.  
28 4-13 June 2008 
Bonn 
Consideration of outstanding methodological issues: 
assessment of forest cover & associated carbon stocks; 
reference emission levels; implications of national and 
sub national approaches; assessing effectiveness; 
demonstration activities; mobilisation of resources.  
29 1-10 Dec 2008 
Poznan 
Recommended the use of the Revised 1996 IPCC 
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Inventories and 
use of Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry Guidelines for estimating 
emission sink and source calculations. 
30 1-10 June 2009 
Bonn 
Consideration on Draft Text on Methodological 
Guidance. 
31 8-12 Dec 2009 
Copenhagen 
Draft Text on Methodological Guidance adopted by 
COP13 
32 31 May—10 June 
2010 
Bonn 
Secretariat requested to increase number of experts 
trained on use of IPCC guidelines and to enhance 
sharing of information, experience and lessons learned 
on use of IPCC guidance by establishment of 
interactive discussion forum on UNFCCC web 
platform.  
34, 35 6-16 June 2011 
Bonn 
Consideration of Safeguard Policy and 
Implementation.  
 
The work of the SBSTA group has resulted in following key COP decisions REDD+: 
 
																																																								
12 SBSTA, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate 
Action, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.23/ADD.1/REV.1 
13 Decision 4/CP.15, Methodological Guidance for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation and Role of the Conservation of the Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement 
of Forest Stocks in Developing Countries. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 
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 Bali COP decision: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action.14 The Bali COP decision encouraged 
parties to undertake REDD+ demonstration activities and contained multiple 
requests for the mobilisation of finance to support efforts to address 
deforestation.15 
 
 Copenhagen COP decision: Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of 
Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest 
Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries. 16 The Copenhagen COP decision 
requested developing country parties to: prepare reports identifying the drivers of 
deforestation, potential activities within their respective country that would result 
in reduced emissions and to develop transparent national forest monitoring 
systems.  
 
 Cancun COP decision: Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on Issues 
Relating to Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing 
Countries, and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forest and 
Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries.17. The Cancun 
COP report provides the types of REDD+ activities encouraged in paragraph 7018, 
																																																								
14 Decision 2/CP.13 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to 
Stimulate Action, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1  
15 Guidance on REDD+ activities from decision 2/CP13 1) Demonstration activities to occur with the 
approval of the host Party; 2) Estimates of reductions or increases in emissions should be founded on 
results-based, demonstrable, transparent and verifiable data and estimated consistently over time; 3) 
Parties are encouraged to use the LULUCFG as the basis for estimating and monitoring emissions; 4) 
Emission reduction from national demonstration activities should be assessed on the basis of national 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; 5) Sub-national demonstration activities should be 
assessed within the boundary used for demonstration and for associated displacement of emissions; 6) 
Reductions in emissions or increases resulting from the demonstration activity should be based on 
historical emissions, taking into account national circumstances; 7) Subnational approaches, where 
applied, should constitute a step towards the development of national approaches, reference levels and 
estimates; 8) Demonstration activities should be consistent with sustainable forest management, noting 
inter alia, the relevant provisions of the UNFF, the UNCCD and the CBD; 9) Experiences in 
implementing activities should be reported and made available via the Web platform; 10) Reporting on 
demonstration activities should include a description of the activities and their effectiveness, and may 
include other information and 11) Independent expert review is encouraged.   
16 Decision 4/CP.15 is entitled “Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable 
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries”, 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 
17Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on Issues Relating to Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries, and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable 
Management of Forest and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, 
FCCC/CP/2010/07/Add.1.  
18 The REDD+ activities encouraged under para. graph 70 are: reducing emissions from deforestation; 
reducing emission from forest degradation; conservation of carbon stocks; sustainable management of 
forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. 
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the capacities necessary to implement REDD+ in paragraph 7119 and sets out a 
number of REDD+ safeguards in Annex I of the agreement. 
 
 Durban COP decision: Guidance on Systems for Providing Information on how 
Safeguards are Addressed and Respected and Modalities Relating to Forest 
Reference Emission Levels and Forest Reference Levels Related to Decision 
1/CP.16.20 This decision reinforces that safeguards must be respected taking into 
account: national circumstances, respective capabilities, national sovereignty and 
legislation, international obligations and gender considerations. A step approach to 
setting national forest reference emission level is recommended and the Annex 
provides Guidelines for submitting information on national reference levels.   
 
B. REDD+ Safeguard Policy Development 
REDD+ safeguards are policies that address the direct and indirect impacts of 
REDD+ investment on communities and ecosystems.21 An underlying goal of 
REDD+ safeguard policy is to ensure that REDD+ initiatives “do no harm”. 
Safeguard policy is therefore a mechanism that can assist in ensuring that some of the 
justice issues associated with REDD+ are addressed. At the international level there 
are a range of competing REDD+ safeguard standards. Within the UNFCCC 
framework the Cancun COP Agreement created a number of safeguard principles for 
REDD+ projects including: transparent governance; respect and full participation 
rights for indigenous people and local communities; actions that reduce the risk of 
biodiversity loss, reversals (permanence considerations) and displacement of 
emissions (leakage considerations). Outside of the UNFCCC process the following 
safeguards have been created: 
         
 UN-REDD Programme has developed a set of Social and Environmental Principles 
and Criteria (SEPC).22 
																																																								
19 Para. graph 71 requests developing country parties to establish (in accordance with national 
circumstances) the following systems and capacities: national strategy plan; a national forest emission 
level or forest reference level; a robust and transparent national forest monitoring system and a system 
on how safeguards are to be addressed while respecting sovereignty. 
20 Decision 12/CP.17 Guidance on Systems for Providing Information on How Safeguards are 
Addressed and Respected and Modalities Relating to Forest Reference Emission Levels and Forest 
Reference Levels Related to Decision 1/CP.16. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2.   
21 Pamela JAGYER et al, “REDD+ Safeguards in National Policy Discourse and Pilot Projects” in 
Arild Angelson, eds., Analysing REDD+ Challenges and Choices, (Centre for International Forestry 
Research, 2012), 301 and Nicholas MOSS and Ruth NUSSBAUM, “A Review of Three REDD+ 
Safeguard Initiatives” (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD Programme 2011) 2 at 
para.  2. 
22 UN-REDD Programme, “Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria” (UN-REDD Programme 
Eight Policy Board Meeting 2012) 
<http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=6985&Itemid=53
> accessed 9 January 2013; principles include (1) Apply norms of democratic governance, as reflected 
in national commitments and Multilateral Agreements; (2) Respect and protect stakeholder rights in 
accordance with international obligations; (3) Promote sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction; 
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 The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility has developed a Common Approach to 
Environmental and Social Safeguards for Multiple Delivery Partners and relies on 
Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment.23 
 CARE International and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance have 
created the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards for use within the 
voluntary carbon market.24   
 
There are concerns that safeguard policy will result in a race to the bottom with 
REDD+ verifying bodies using the safeguard policy with the lowest thresholds, so 
as to reduce transaction costs. No one safeguard standard addresses all concerns 
associated with REDD+, though the CARE International Social and Environmental 
safeguards have received praise for addressing tenure related issues.25 Any future 
legally binding safeguard REDD+ instrument is advised to borrow from all the 
above the standards, pulling the land tenure considerations from the CARE 
International standards and the social justice criteria from the UN REDD Program 
principles in order to ensure that the concerns raised by REDD+ investment are 
adequately addressed by international policy.     
 
C. REDD+ Practice 
Despite the lack of a legally binding REDD+ instrument, a range of REDD+ activities 
are taking place. There is concern by some developing States and NGO groups that 
REDD+ activities are taking place without global consensus on a number of key 
REDD+ issues. These stakeholders are concerned that existing REDD+ pilot studies 
and their associated policy frameworks will influence the development of a legally 
binding REDD+ instrument as opposed to the development of a legally binding 
instrument based on international negotiation and acceptance. The UN REDD 
platform identifies two institutions as playing a large role in the implementation of 
demonstration REDD+ activities. These two bodies are the United Nations 
Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD Programme) and the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF), operating under the Wold Bank umbrella. In addition to 
																																																																																																																																																														
(4) Contribute to low-carbon, climate-resilient sustainable development policy, consistent with national 
development strategies, national forest programmes, and commitments under international conventions 
and agreements; (5) Protect natural forest from degradation and/or conversion; (6) Maintain and 
enhance multiple functions of forests including conservation of biodiversity and provision of 
ecosystem services; (7) Avoid or minimise adverse impacts on non-forest ecosystem services and 
biodiversity. 
23 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, “Common Approach to Environmental and Social Safeguards for 
Multiple Delivery Partners” (2012), online: Forest Carbon Partnership 
<http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/A
ug2012/FCPF%20Readiness%20Fund%20Common%20Approach%208-9-12.pdf>. 
24 See <http://www.redd-standards.org/>. 
25 Eduard MERGER, Micheal DUTSCHKE, and Louise VERCHOT, "Options for REDD+ Voluntary 
Certification to Ensure Net GHG Benefits, Poverty Alleviation, Sustainable Management of Forests 
and Biodiversity Conservation" (2011) 2 Forests 550.  
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these sources of REDD+ finance and support, the voluntary carbon market is also 
selling carbon credits generated from REDD+ activities.   
The UN-REDD Programme was established in 2008 to assist developing countries 
to build capacity to participate in a future REDD+ mechanism. As of January 2013, 
the UN-REDD Programme has partnered with 46 countries across Africa, the Asia-
Pacific region, Latin America, and the Caribbean.26 The UN-REDD Programme’s 
Policy Board has approved a total of US $67.3 million for REDD National 
Programmes in 16 countries.27. Of the 16 National Programmes, 13 are in the (third 
and final) inception and implementation phase as of October 2012.28  
In 2006 the World Bank created the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 
with the purpose of building capacity for REDD+ activities in developing countries 
and to test some pilot programs on performance-based incentive payments schemes.29 
The World Bank’s FCPF supports REDD demonstration activities through two 
separate mechanisms: the Readiness Mechanism Fund and the Carbon Finance 
Mechanism Fund.30 At the end of the 2011 fiscal year, 24 countries had submitted 
Readiness Preparation Proposals or draft Readiness Preparation Proposals, and close 
to US $65 million had been allocated in Readiness Preparation grants to 18 
countries.31 In 2011 the Carbon Finance Mechanism became operational. Countries 
that have made significant progress under the Readiness Mechanism are eligible to 
apply, or authorise an entity within their country to apply for funds under the Carbon 
Finance Mechanism by submitting an emission reductions idea note. A small number 
of countries with approved emission reduction notes will then be in a position to enter 
																																																								
26 UN-REDD Programme, “UN-REDD Programme Partner Countries” (2012), online: UN-REDD 
Programme <http://www.un-redd.org/Partner_Countries/tabid/102663/Default.aspx>. 
27 Ibid.; Countries with national programmes include (in alphabetical order) Bolivia, Cambodia, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Para. guay, the Philippines, Republic of Congo, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Viet Nam and 
Zambia. 
28 Ibid.; countries in the inception and implementation phase include: Bolivia, Cambodia, DRC, 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Panama, PNG, Para. guay, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Viet Nam 
and Zambia. 
29 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, “Information Memorandum” (2008) 1 para.  5-2 para.  1 online: 
FCPF 
<http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/F
CPF_Info_Memo_06-13-08.pdf>. 
30 Ibid. 2 para.  3; “Under the [readiness] mechanism, [FCPF] intends to assist developing tropical and 
sub-tropical countries prepare themselves to participate in a future, large-scale system of positive 
incentives for REDD. This will include, but is not limited to: (i) determining a national reference 
scenario based on historical emissions from deforestation and degradation and, where needed and 
feasible, an assessment of how these emissions would evolve in the future; (ii) preparing a national 
REDD strategy; and (iii) establishing a monitoring system for emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation”; Under the Carbon Finance Mechanism, FCPF “will support a few countries that will 
have successfully participated in the Readiness Mechanism to join, on a voluntary basis, a second 
mechanism through which [FCPF] will test and evaluate incentive payments for REDD programmes… 
The Carbon Fund will remunerate the selected countries in accordance with negotiated contracts for 
verifiably reducing emissions beyond the reference scenario”. 
31 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, “2011 Annual Report” (2011), online: FCPF 
<http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/O
ct2011/FCPF_Carbon_AR_FINAL_10_3.pdf>. 
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into emission reductions payment agreements.32 As of October 2012, Costa Rica, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Vietnam have presented well-developed emission 
reduction programmes and Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico and Nepal and started work on 
creating emission reduction programmes.   
The Kyoto carbon market, also known as the compliance market, does not 
currently allow for REDD+ generated carbon credits to be traded. As such, REDD+ 
credits are currently traded within voluntary carbon markets.33 Participants are 
motivated to engage with voluntary carbon markets due to a range of non-regulatory 
factors such as corporate GHG reduction targets, resale or investment potential, pre-
compliance with predicted regulations, public relations or branding efforts, or direct 
concerns for climate change.34 For the past three years, a Forest Trends initiative, 
Ecosystem Marketplace, has produced a report that summarizes the state of the 
voluntary forest carbon market based on responses from forest project developers and 
secondary market suppliers.35 The 2012 report reveals that the value for forestry 
offsets in the global marketplace totalled $237 million in 2011, an increase from the 
previous year.36 At the global level, successfully contracted credits in 2011 were 
situated on 5 million forested hectares of forest land, of which 4.2 million hectares 
could be attributed to REDD+ projects.37 
 
II. THE LANGUAGE OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
The definition of justice, like many grand concepts, is elusive. As Wenz states  
 
“Justice is a contested concept. Some people claim, as does libertarian Robert Nozick, that 
justice requires for example absolute respect for property rights, even if this results in greater 
inequality between rich and poor. Others such as the liberal contractarian John Rawls believe, to 
the contrary that justice requires maximum equality compatible with individual incentives to 
promote economic growth. Still others, including the communitarian Amitai Etzioni, think that 
justice rests on community solidarity or traditional moral values”.38 
 
The values underlying the different definitions of justice vary significantly. This 
article does not attempt to define justice, but instead examines the use of the language 
of “justice” within international REDD+ negotiations. The basic dictionary definition 
																																																								
32 Payments will be given to countries in exchange for the verified emission reductions that are 
generated. Ibid. 
33 See generally Rowena MAGUIRE, “Opportunities for Forest Finance: Compliance and Voluntary 
Markets” (2012) 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 100.  
34 Molly PETERS-STANLEY, Katherine HAMILTON & Daphne YIN, Leveraging the Landscape:  
State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2012, Ecosystem Marketplace/Forest Trends, at vi, fig. 6 (2012), 
online: <http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3242.pdf>. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Ibid., at i.  
37 Ibid., at iii.  
38  Peter WENZ, “Does Environmentalism Promote Injustice for the Poor?” in Ronald SANDLER and 
Phaedra PEZULLO, eds., Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge 
to the Environmental Movement (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 57 at 57-58.  
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of justice corresponds with ideas of fairness, equity and just behaviour and 
treatment,39 and it these ideals that underlie the dictionary definition of justice that 
have presented within REDD+ negotiations. The language of justice is not overtly 
present within the text of international environmental instruments. However, on closer 
examination, it is clear that values associated with justice have influenced the 
development of international environmental law. Many international environmental 
principles such as: the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, inter-
generational equity, intra-generational equity and the polluter pays principle all have 
notions of fairness at their core.  
The language of justice is more commonly used and accepted within international 
criminal law and human rights settings. Ideas concerning the rule of law; an impartial 
judiciary; adequate legal representation; and protection of basic rights and liberties 
align more easily with common understandings of the concept of justice. Linking the 
environment to justice is more of an abstract connection. Justice issues that arise in 
connection with the environment or rather with decisions concerning the environment 
are often discussed using theories of procedural justice. Procedural justice is 
associated with “access to justice” type considerations including: meaningful 
involvement and participation of relevant stakeholders in decision making processes, 
access to information, access to affordable and quality legal advice, legal rights 
associated with due process including the rights of judicial and merit review, rights of 
standing and consideration of the potential liabilities associated with bringing court 
actions (costs and time). Therefore, considerations of justice and the environment in 
this sense focus on the impacts for humans arising as a result of environmental 
decisions and governance processes.  
 This link between environmental decisions and injustice was first made at the 
domestic level, as opposed to the international level. The placement of toxic 
chemicals and other hazardous facilities in low socio-economic and coloured 
communities in the United States (US) gave rise to discussions about the justice 
implications of environmental management decisions.40 These issues were framed as 
environmental justice concerns. The definition of environmental justice in this context 
comes from US Environmental Protection Agency who defines environmental justice 
as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, 
colour, sex, national origin or income with respect to the development, 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies”.41 
More recently, the domestic frame of environmental justice has been applied at the 
international level. Roberts suggests that this has occurred to expose transnational and 
																																																								
39Cambridge Online Dictionary.   
40Detailed examination of the US environmental justice movement is beyond the scope of this article. 
On this topic see Luke W COLE and Sheila R FOSTER, From the ground up: environmental racism 
and the rise of the environmental justice movement, (New York: New York University Press 2001) and 
Ronald SANDLER and Phaedra PEZZULLO (eds) Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The 
Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2007).  
41 United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Justice Program and Civil Rights” 
(September, 2013), online: EPA <http://www.epa.gov/region1/ej/>.  
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global inequalities.42 Transnational inequality concerns the impacts of multinational 
corporations on communities in developing countries while global inequality is the 
term used to the refer to the global patterns of inequality arising as a result of 
exposure and vulnerability to detrimental environmental conditions. A theory of 
climate justice is starting to emerge which can be distinguished by its focus on the 
climate related perspectives of the global inequality frame. The climate justice frame 
has been employed to argue that poor nations are unable to cope and respond to 
climate disasters such as spreading drought and agricultural instability in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, sea level rise in Pacific Island Atolls and Bangladesh, and increased cyclone 
risk. This is perceived as a justice issue due to low emission profiles of these nations 
and the fact that those least responsible for climate change are the ones who will 
suffer the most as a result of climate change. Some developing nations and many 
NGO groups use the climate justice frame within their advocacy and campaign 
strategies at UNFCCC COP negotiations.43 The language of climate justice is yet to 
be officially endorsed by the climate regime and no UNFCCC legally binding 
instrument or COP decision at present has adopted the climate justice terminology. 
The climate regime instead uses the language of vulnerability and resilience to 
describe exposure to environmental inequalities.44  
Despite lack of formal UNFCCC endorsement of the language of justice, there is 
some limited evidence of the justice frame being used in connection with the 
environment regulation. The Rio+20 negotiations hosted in Brazil in 2012 saw the 
development of soft law instrument entitled The Future We Want. This instrument 
uses the language of justice in three instances: calling for access to justice in 
environmental matters45, stressing the need to provide social protection to all 
members of society and foster growth, resilience, social justice and cohesion46 and a 
call for equal access to justice and legal support for women47. The inclusion of the 
language of justice in the Rio+20 instrument could be viewed in two ways. Firstly, the 
language of justice here could be seen to be fairly insignificant development. Such a 
view could be justified on the soft law nature of the text and wide breath of subject 
matter and obligations raised by the text. Alternatively, inclusion of the language of 
justice could be seen as a reflection of the increasing use of the language of justice in 
the context of environmental regulation. Regardless of whether or not the term is or is 
																																																								
42 J Timmons ROBERTS, “Globalising Environmental Justice” in Ronald SANDLER and Phaedra 
PEZZULLO, eds., Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the 
Environmental Movement, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2007). 
43 Bolivia is a country which has endorsed this frame and which has held a conference in 2020 on the 
World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. See 
<http://www.climate-justice-action.org/mobilization/cochabamba/>. 
44 Further information on this: Rowena MAGUIRE and Bridget LEWIS, “The Influence of Justice 
Theories on International Climate Policies and Measures” (2012) 8 Macquarie Journal of International 
and Comparative Environmental Law 16.   
45 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development,“The Future We Want: Outcome 
Document Developed at Rio+20”, article 99, online: UNCSD 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/727The%20Future%20We%20Want%2019%20June%
201230pm.pdf.>. 
46 Ibid., article 156. 
47 Ibid., article 238. 
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not used within the text of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, non-state actors 
seem to see benefits in framing their arguments through a justice lens. It is not exactly 
clear as to why these groups use the frame of justice, but it is suggested that the 
language of justice is employed to draw attention to the issue and to communicate that 
urgent action is required.  
 
III. FRAMING REDD+ AS A JUSTICE ISSUE AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEVEL 
 
There is little consensus within the literature as well as within negotiations as to what 
justice requires in the context of REDD+.48 Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the 
concept and requirements of justice in respect of REDD+, there is consensus that 
REDD+ raises significant justice issues. The language of justice has entered into the 
REDD+ sphere. Okereke and Dooley identify six broad conceptions of justice within 
the REDD+ negotiations:  
 
1. Justice as utilitarianism: impact of policy on human welfare - Norway;  
2. Justice as liberal egalitarianism: social and economic inequalities to be 
arranged for the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members; 
corresponding with historical responsibility—Central African Forests 
Commission (COMIFAC);  
3. Market Justice: aligned with neoliberal governance - CfRN, Latin American;  
4. Justice as mutual advantage: agreements that have positive net benefit for all; 
securing relative economic gains as main objective—India, Brazil;  
5. Communitarianism as justice: justice can only be determined on the basis of 
cultural context and values associated with the good in question - Tuvalu;  
6. Justice as meeting needs: moral equality of humans irrespective of race or 
nationality—Bolivia.49  
  
This article does not advocate for one branch of justice to be considered, as it is 
believed that all theories of justice are useful in explaining and identifying different 
issues of injustice associated with REDD+. As this article looks at the ingredients 
required for an equitable legally binding REDD+ instrument, it is suggested that the 
theory of procedural justice is particularly useful as this theory of justice has 
previously been used to create legal rights and obligations in other spheres.   A 
number of non-state actors are active participants within the REDD+ negotiations and 
these networks do not define or align their campaigns to particular justice theories, 
instead they tend to focus on the broader notions of fairness and equality associated 
																																																								
48 Melissa FARRIS, “The Sound of Falling Trees: Integrating Environmental Justice Principles into the 
Climate Change Framework for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD)” 
(2010) 20 Fordham Environmental Law Review 515. 
49 Chukwumerije OKEREKE and Kate DOOLEY, “Principles in Justice in Proposals and Policy 
Approaches to Avoided Deforestation: Towards a post-Kyoto Climate Change” (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 82. 
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with the dictionary definition of justice.  Generally speaking, these groups identify the 
following issues of justice associated with REDD+ investment:   
 Potential for indigenous and local forest dwellers rights to be overlooked 
during REDD+ investments;   
 Concern that a market based REDD+ mechanism will not deliver benefits to 
local forest stakeholders nor ensure solid emission reductions; and   
 These groups also advocate for the use of safeguard policy that ensures that 
social and environmental criteria are satisfied, so as to prevent any unintended 
consequences from REDD+ investment. 
 
This article explores three non-state actors networks that are active in REDD+ 
negotiation space the: Climate Justice Network, the Third World Network and the 
Indigenous Environment Network with the purpose of exploring the debate around 
justice and REDD+ at the international level.  While each of these networks share 
common positions in respect of their REDD+, these networks each hold different 
underlying ideologies concerning justice and environmental regulation and views on 
the action required to redress injustice.   
 
A. Climate Justice Network and REDD+ 
The climate justice movement is based upon the recognition that the adverse impacts 
of climate change are related to industrialisation and the associated emissions of these 
developments. It is argued that the benefits of industrialisation are not spread equally 
across the globe and the onset of climate change highlights global discrepancies in 
power and access to resources.50 The climate justice movement rejects “false 
solutions to climate change” such as market-based mechanisms including cap and 
trade carbon trading scheme; and technology fixes such as geo-sequestration, carbon 
capture and storage, agrofuels, nuclear power, biochar, large hydroelectricity projects, 
biomass, construction of sea walls and the spraying of sulphates into the atmosphere 
to block the sun’s rays instead calling for a systems change to address climate change. 
51   
Climate justice networks are fluid organisations that tend to gather momentum 
during UNFCCC COP negotiations. During these peak periods a range of existing 
international environmental, indigenous and other networks converge to take action 
on climate justice. Outside of the UNFCCC arena the movement has organised non-
state functions such as The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the 
Rights of Mother Nature.52 The climate justice movement is not based on one 
																																																								
50 Stephanie LONG, Ellen ROBERTS and Julia DEHM, “Climate Justice inside and outside of the 
UNFCCC: The example of REDD” (2012) 66 Journal of Australian Political Economy 222 at 224.  
51 Systems Change not Climate Change: A People’s Declaration from Klimaforum (2009)  
52 The Bolivian President Morales announced that his country would host an alternative COP meeting 
following the Copenhagen COP negotiations. The conference hosted in April of 2010 saw 35,000 
climate justice activists from 142 countries attend the conference. The conference produced The 
Cochambamba Protocol: People’s Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth.  
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particular branch of justice, but instead borrows from a range of justice theories. The 
movement uses a variety of ethical frames and theories including: environmental 
justice, social justice, human rights, collective rights and historical responsibility for 
climate change.  
 
The two key objectives of the climate justice movement in respect of REDD+ are 
to: advocate against the use of market based approaches for REDD+ credits; and to 
create a bigger role for non-state players such as Indigenous groups and civil society 
groups in the REDD+ negotiations.53 The climate justice movement feels that 
 
the dominance of market mechanisms with the UNFCCC is evidence that international climate 
policy is controlled by an elite alliance of big business, commodities traders, financial firms, 
neoclassical economic theories and middle class environmentalists. The UNFCCC has become a 
forum characterised by inequalities in representation, power imbalances, corporate influence, 
meetings behind closed doors, [and] dismissals of proposals which are not market orientated54  
 
As such, the climate justice movement advocates for the creation of REDD+ 
benefit sharing mechanisms that are disconnected from market investment. The 
climate justice movement is concerned that market based payment mechanism will 
yield lower and unstable returns for communities. This argument is supported by a 
range of state parties to the UNFCCC who advocate for the use of a fund-based 
approach for REDD+ payments.55 Arguments made in opposition of market-based 
REDD+ mechanism include:  
 
 Carbon markets do not reduce emissions but merely shift the burden of emission 
reduction from developed countries to developing countries. This type of 
commodification of forests allows wealthy corporations to continue polluting, 
which further exacerbates the risks posed to forests from a warming climate. 
 Existing market based emission reduction schemes have not resulted in the 
expected emission reduction rate. It is estimated that between 20-65% of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects did not result in real emission 
reductions. Furthermore, deforestation was not included in the CDM or in the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme because of insurmountable 
challenges associated with measuring forest carbon storage and sequestration. 
 The impermanence of forest carbon sequestration means that forest carbon 
stocks will increase carbon in the atmosphere now and in the future. 
 Carbon trading will not finance the types of forest protection activities that are 
most needed. The current emphasis on generating carbon credits from REDD+ 
will lock developing countries into expensive and futile exercise to accurately 
measure forest carbon. Efforts should instead be focused on addressing the 
																																																								
53LONG, supra note 50 at 222.   
54 Ibid., p229.  
55 “Differing views on market based approaches for REDD+ finance” Third World Network (22 May 
2010), online: Third World Network 
<http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/news/Bonn09/TWN_bonn09_up14.pdf>. 
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drivers of deforestation and involve activities like institutional reform, law 
enforcement and developing alternative livelihood income and sources.56  
 
The role of the climate justice movement in shaping the UNFCCC global 
debate is a reflection of the wider trend of non-state institutions participating in 
and influencing international norm setting processes.57 The contributions of non-
state actors to the UNFCCC are increasingly recognised as valuable58 and non-
state actors within the UNFCCC process wish to improve their standing. 
 
B. Third World Network and REDD+ 
Third world approaches to international law challenge the content of the international 
law, by highlighting the inequitable nature of the rules transferred from the past. The 
impacts of colonisation on both past and present populations are used to show that a 
system of western superiority within international institutions and processes exists.59 
In the environmental context, attention is directed towards the impacts of 
industrialisation and the accompanying undesirable environmental effects such as air, 
land and water degradation. Under this frame, developing countries perceive 
themselves as being asked to manage their resources for the benefit of western 
interests. A statement from the Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 1992 Earth Summit 
negotiations states the third world position regarding international forest regulation 
eloquently: 
 
“The poor are not asking for charity. When the rich chopped down their own forests, built their 
own poison-belching factories and scoured the world for cheap resources, the poor said nothing. 
Indeed they paid for the development of the rich. Now the rich regulate the development of the 
poor countries. And yet any suggestion that the rich compensate the poor adequately is regarded 
as outrageous. As colonies we were exploited. Now as independent nations are we to be equally 
exploited?.”60  
 
While REDD+ seeks to provide compensation to developing countries for 
forest conservation, controversy exists over the nature of this compensation. 
Compensation from market-based sources is not acceptable to Third World 
Network advocates. Such compensation is unacceptable, as it reinforces existing 
patterns of power, wealth and resource distribution. These networks instead want 
																																																								
56 “Climate Justice Brief, Forests and REDD” Third World Network (November 2010), online: Third 
World Network <http://twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/pdf/climate_justice_briefs/09.Forests.pdf>. 
57 Some background on this trend: Daniel BODANSKY, “The Legitimacy of International 
Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law” (1999) 93 American Journal 
of International Law 596.  
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59 Karen MICKELSON, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse” 
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funding that provides adequate, predicable and sustained financing for voluntary 
and rights-based avoided deforestation strategies.61  
 
C. Indigenous Networks and REDD+ 
Many Indigenous groups have actively participated in REDD+ negotiations as a result 
of the significant social risks that REDD+ carries for Indigenous People.62 REDD+ 
policy is evolving against a backdrop of historical dispossession, political exclusion 
and cultural marginalisation of Indigenous Peoples.63 Existing forest management has 
dispossessed, excluded and marginalised forest people. While there is potential for 
REDD+ projects to benefit Indigenous People, there are very valid concerns that the 
development and subsistence rights of Indigenous People will conflict with the carbon 
objectives of REDD+. The substantive and procedural human rights of Indigenous 
forest communities are not as present coherently protected within REDD+ policies.64  
The “UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People” considered the plight of forest-dwelling indigenous 
communities.65 Of particular concern to the special rapporteur, was the lack of formal 
tenure recognition of customary ownership rights over forest areas; and the granting 
of timber concession rights to large forestry corporations on areas of 
indigenous/customary land. The Special Rapporteur found that forests of Indigenous 
People have been systematically affected by the activities of large forestry 
corporations resulting in the progressive destruction of their traditional means of 
subsistence. Such experiences have affected the living conditions of indigenous 
communities in the equatorial forests of Central Africa, the Amazon basin, the boreal 
forests of Siberia and America, the Andean range and South‐East Asia, as well as the 
Pacific islands.    
Some indigenous networks such as the Indigenous Environment Network have 
flatly refused to accept any form of forest carbon scheme or regulation on their land, 
referring to the REDD+ initiative as CO2lonialism of forests. Most groups, however, 
including the International Indigenous People’s Forum on Climate Change accept the 
idea of forest carbon schemes on the condition that the right to “free, prior and 
informed consent” is a core foundation of REDD+ policies.66 The main campaign 
slogan used by these networks being “No Rights, no REDD” or “Rights before 
REDD”.  
																																																								
61 Submission b of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Co-
operation Action, BONN, 2010.  
62 Tom GRIFFTH “Seeing REDD? Forests, Climate Change Mitigation and the Rights of Indigenous 
People”, Forest People Program, 2009.   
63 Thomas SIKOR, “REDD-Plus, Forest People’s Rights and Nested Climate Governance” (2010) 20 
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While there is consensus among indigenous groups that a “rights-based approach” 
to REDD is critical, there are a number of views on the form that such rights should 
take. These views range from: redistribution of forest tenure; rights for Indigenous 
People in forest areas; or recognition of the role of human rights in forestry 
management.67 REDD+ policy as currently designed is unlikely to result in a 
redistribution of forest tenure rights. Lessons from the pilot REDD+ projects suggest 
that future REDD+ investments will be made in areas free of tenure conflict.68 As 
such, it is unlikely that REDD+ will provide the impetuses required for fundamental 
changes to tenure systems allowing for recognition of indigenous land rights. It is 
suggested that REDD+ should instead aim to ensure: 1) recognition of indigenous 
right to environmental self-determination; 2) the entitlement to redress for 
environmental injustices; and 3) direct consultation.69 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) 
contains a number of provisions relevant to forest dwelling indigenous communities.70 
Rights enshrined in the document include: right not be forcefully removed from 
lands71; rights to maintain and strengthen relation with lands and waters72; rights to 
ensure that the environment is protected73 and rights to compensation when land is 
taken, used or damaged74. Article 26 is the key provision from a land rights 
perspective, providing for: a right to land; rights to use and control resources on the 
land; and obligations for states to give legal recognition to such rights. UNDRIP 
emphasizes the importance of obtaining “free, prior and informed consent” (FPIC) of 
indigenous groups before dealing with land under their control. The current REDD+ 
COP safeguards75 only require “full and effective participation” of Indigenous 
People. This wording provides a much lower threshold to satisfy and will not ensure 
that consent of Indigenous People is obtained prior to REDD+ investment. As such, 
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REDD+ safeguard policy contravenes existing international law concerning the rights 
of Indigenous People, thus presenting a major justice issue.76  
 
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF A JUST LEGALLY 
BINDING REDD+ INSTRUMENT 
The above analysis has shown that there are a range of justice considerations relevant 
to REDD+ instrument design. The following section provides a broad overview of the 
types of issues, requirements and principles that should feature within negotiations 
concerning a legally binding REDD+ instrument based on this analysis. The 
requirements listed are by no means exhaustive, but instead provide examples of 
issues and principles that are important to REDD+ when viewed from a justice lens. 
 
A. Form and Nature of a REDD+ Agreement: 
Development of a legally binding REDD+ instrument is currently being explored 
within the UNFCCC. The current favoured form approach for REDD+ is a separate 
and additional mechanism to the existing Kyoto Protocol market mechanisms. This is 
the approach envisaged by the Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea REDD+ original 
proposal.77 This approach would only work if the UNFCCC is maintained as the 
founding and principle instrument of the regime, thus allowing a REDD+ instrument 
to sit beneath this infrastructure. Another alternative option would be the creation of a 
new comprehensive climate treaty, which creates REDD+ machinery within its text. 
Slow progress on resolving many other issues on the UNFCCC agenda such as 
mitigation commitments and adaptation funding suggests that it may be easier and 
quicker to negotiate a separate REDD+ instrument that sits below the UNFCCC.    
The nature that a REDD+ instrument should take is currently controversial.78 
Options include:  
 Market-based approach: where carbon credits are created via a regulatory 
process, and then sold within a market structure to either public or private 
bodies (for a specified price); or a 
 Fund-based approach: where payments for the “result” generated by REDD+ 
activities are disbursed through a fund structure, which acts as an intermediary 
institution between the donor and host country. This intermediary institution 
would manage the allocation funds according to pre-determined rules and 
procedures. 
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It is possible that a combination of both market and fund-based approaches could 
be included as financing mechanisms within the REDD+ instrument. Part of the 
current debate regarding REDD+ focuses on which financing model is more “just” in 
terms of the outcomes it would facilitate for stakeholders, particularly more 
vulnerable groups. As discussed, opponents to market-based approaches fear that the 
imbalance of power between carbon investors and forest dependent-communities will 
result in the rights of the latter being ignored or abused. A fund model that operates 
under specified rules and procedures would play the role of intermediary between the 
body paying REDD+ finance and those receiving funds according to pre-determined 
criteria.  
The concept of benefit sharing is used within REDD+ to refer to process that 
distributes REDD+ investments to stakeholders in emission reduction activities. There 
is at present no international law concerning benefit sharing in the REDD+ context. 
Benefits may be distributed at the national, subnational or project level and or may 
also be based upon performance indicators being satisfied. An international legally 
binding REDD+ instrument will need to provide some guidance on benefit sharing 
mechanism and governance. A just and equitable benefit sharing mechanism will be 
designed to ensure that payments reach those involved at the local level as well as 
ensuring that any opportunity cost or risks associated with the REDD+ activity are 
compensated through the mechanism. Guidance for this mechanism can be drawn 
from benefit sharing mechanisms developed for the Convention for Biological 
Diversity79 under the Nagoya Protocol.80   
Fund distribution could be linked to carbon ownership rights, but this is not 
essential. The distribution of income under a fund model would be based on the 
policy choice most appropriate for the country or state where the REDD+ investment 
is occurring. For example, the State may decide to distribute REDD+ investment in 
accordance with domestic forestry policies or along existing community forestry 
association networks. It is essential that benefits channelled under a fund approach are 
transferred in a transparent and accountable manner. Under this approach, funds may 
be distributed along existing government structures in which case issues such as case 
corruption or elite capture may arise. If untested distribution networks are used, 
stringent transparency procedures would need to be in place to ensure that payments 
were disbursed appropriately. The debate regarding the most appropriate funding 
model is live within the negotiations and is likely to remain so.  
 
B. Objective of Regime 
During the Bali COP negotiations, REDD+ generated excitement as a mechanism to 
achieve substantial emissions reductions via avoided deforestation and enhanced 
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carbon sequestration. During subsequent negotiations, REDD+ has evolved to 
acknowledge the “multiple benefits” of forests and the capacity of the mechanism to 
provide increased livelihoods for forest-dependent communities. Carbon has become 
a “co-benefit” of REDD+ alongside its other benefits. There is at present no 
agreement on the relative priority of carbon values versus non-carbon values or any 
guidance on how to determine which value should take priority.81 As such, it is 
crucial that any future legally binding REDD+ instrument has a clear objective that 
can be implemented, without confusion as to which forest service or value takes 
precedence. If REDD+ policy is able to create a methodology for determining conflict 
between the promotion of various forest services, this will make a significant 
contribution to the law and governance of sustainable forest management 
worldwide.82 This mechanism will need to balance the goals of climate change 
mitigation of the UNFCCC against the promotion of the multiple benefits of forests in 
terms of their capacity to deliver ecosystem services (as a public good) and better 
lifestyles for local communities. An instrument founded on considerations of justice 
will seek to ensure that carbon forest values do not overshadow other forest values.  
 
C. Guiding Principles of the Regime 
Principles are used within regulatory frameworks to guide the interpretation and 
implementation of the obligations specified in the instrument. Existing international 
environmental law principles should lay the foundations of a REDD+ legally binding 
instrument. The basis for including existing international principles is threefold: 
 
1. Many of these principles have a basis in equity and as such will assist in 
resolving justice concerns and issues associated with REDD+; 
2. International law should evolve consistently aligned with existing agreements, 
principles and rules; and 
3. It is common practice to include existing international principles within 
founding international instruments.    
 
A number of international environmental principles are already part of the 
UNFCCC architecture. Article 3 of the UNFCCC provides for the application of: 
common but differentiated responsibility, inter-generational and intra-generational 
equity, the precautionary principle, sustainable development and the principles of 
cooperation. Inclusion of these principles within the UNFCCC instrument was 
controversial. The United States of America, along with other developed countries, 
																																																								
81 Constance McDERMOTT et al, “Operationalizing Social Safeguards in REDD+: actors, interests 
and ideas” (2012) 21 Environmental Science and Policy 63 at 64, and on the issue of environmental 
effectiveness and cost efficiency see Andrea CATTANEO et al, “On International Equity in Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation” (2010) 13 Environmental Science and Policy 742.  
82 See generally on this issue: Constance MCDERMOTT, “REDDuced: From Sustainability to legality 
to units of carbon –The search for common interests in international forest governance” (2012) 
Environmental Science and Policy (article in press).  
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did not want to include open-ended principles within the agreement due to concerns 
that their inclusion would lead to the creation of additional commitments beyond 
those clearly articulated within the Convention. Developing countries felt that it was 
essential to include a statement on principles within the articles of the agreement to 
guide the implementation of the text.83 The final text of the agreement adopts the 
developing country perspective, thus creating within Article 3 a normative framework 
to support the implementation of the UNFCCC.84 The principles contained within 
Article 3 are therefore not directly enforceable, but can be used to inform policy 
development and implementation modalities within the broader climate change 
regime. There are a number of international environmental principles that should 
feature in a legally binding REDD+ instrument. These include: sovereignty; 
preventive action; common but differentiated responsibility; and sustainable 
development (encompassing inter-generational equity, intra-generational equity and 
integration). In addition, the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) 
must be included within a binding REDD+ instrument.  
 
1. Sovereignty 
International forest negotiations have had issues of fairness and equity at the centre of 
the debate since the Earth Summit negotiations in 1992. The most controversial issue 
facing international forest regulation has been issues connected with State 
Sovereignty.85 States view fairness in connection with forest regulation as involving 
freedom to legislate and manage forest areas according to national, not international 
priorities. Those States with high levels of forest cover have fiercely guarded 
sovereign rights to regulate forest use and management, due to the contribution that 
forest products make to these countries’ economies. The unwillingness of States to 
create legally binding international standards concerning forest use and management 
has been associated with the lack of global progress in implementing sustainable 
forest management globally.86 While States have previously been unwilling to cede 
sovereignty over forest areas, REDD+ policy shows a shift in States attitudes to 
accepting some degree of infringement upon their forest rights, on the basis that 
adequate compensation is provided for this infringement.87 There are three reasons 
which explain why REDD+ has not been perceived as a threat upon State sovereignty:  
 
																																																								
83 Daniel BODANSKY, “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
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84 Yamin and Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 66.  
85 David HUMPHREYS, Logjam: Deforestation and Crisis of Global Governance (Earthscan 2006) at 
chapter 5. 
86 See generally Catherine MCKENZIE, “Lessons from Forestry for International Environmental Law” 
(2012) 21 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 114.  
87 Rowena MAGUIRE, Global Forest Governance: Legal Concepts and Policy Trends, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar , 2013) at chapter 10 and Thomas SIKOR, “Forest Justice: Towards a New Agenda for 
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1. Engagement in the REDD+ process in on a voluntary basis. Under current COP 
rules, demonstration activities must occur with the approval of the host 
country;88    
2. REDD+ policy does not cover all forest areas within the State’s territory, rather 
it only applies to particular project or demonstration sites; 
3. While REDD+ is an infringement upon sovereign rights, this infringement has 
been accepted on the basis that compensation is provided by the initiative.   
 
REDD+ therefore only restricts States sovereign rights in limited circumstances. 
Principle 2(a) of the non-legally binding forest principles drafted in 199289 provides 
an example of wording that could be adjusted for a REDD+ sovereignty statement. 
The amendments to the text for REDD+ purposes made in italics:   
 
“States have the sovereign and inalienable right to utilize, manage and develop their forests in 
accordance with their development needs and level of socio-economic development on the basis 
of national policies consistent with sustainable development and legislation”   [States may 
voluntarily consent to host REDD+ projects within their territory. Such projects only limit 
sovereign rights over the particular REDD+ project site. Such limitation is only accepted on the 
basis the appropriate compensation is received by the state or individuals of the State].  
2. Preventative Action 
The principle of preventative action requires states to prevent damage to the 
environment and to reduce, limit, or control activities which might cause or risk such 
damage.90 Reducing deforestation and improving land use management are both 
examples of REDD+ type activities that prevent damage to the environment. 
Unsustainable forest and land management are associated with a host of 
environmental harms such as soil degradation; biodiversity loss; changes in rainfall 
patters and the loss of climatic regulating services. A REDD+ legally binding 
instrument should recognise that REDD+ activities apply the principle of preventative 
action. The principle of prevention is useful in providing a basis upon which REDD+ 
action should be taken.  
 
																																																								
88 Decision 2/CP.13 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to 
Stimulate Action. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 
89 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Non-legally Binding Authoritative 
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3. Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) adopts a 
substantive approach to justice by recognising that different groups before the law 
require different rights and responsibilities. As such, the principle recognises:  
 
 The common responsibility of countries to protect the environment; 
 The differing contributions of countries to environmental degradation; and 
 The differing inabilities of countries to prevent, reduce and control 
environmental degradation. 91 
CBDR in the context of REDD+ should recognise the common responsibility of 
states to manage forest land sustainably, while recognising that there are different 
capacities among states to implement REDD+ or sustainable forest management 
initiatives. Developing countries with high levels of forest cover such as Indonesia, 
Congo, Brazil and Papua New Guinea should be adequately supported, so that 
REDD+ does not operate as a burden on nations with high forest cover and 
appropriate international technical and financial support provided to assist in 
managing these forests which are in essence being managed for global as oppose to 
national interests. 
4. Sustainable Development 
The concept of sustainable development originates from the 1987 Brundtland Report 
where the concept was described as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.92 
The concept of sustainable development has become the one of the key goals of 
international environmental and developmental regimes, though implementation of 
the concept remains elusive.93 Sands identifies four principles of the concept of 
sustainable development: 
1. The need to preserve natural resources for the benefit of future generations (the 
principle of inter-generational equity);   
																																																								
91 Angela WILLIAMS, “Promoting Justice within the International Legal System: Prospects for 
Climate Refugees”, in Benjamin  RICHARDSON , Heather MCLEOD-KILMURRAY  and Stephan 
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92 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
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2. The aim of exploiting natural resources in a manner which is sustainable or 
prudent or rational or wise or appropriate (the principles of sustainable use); 
3. The equitable use of natural resources, which implies that use by one state must 
take account of the needs of other states (the principle of equitable use or intra-
generational equity); 
4. The need to ensure that environmental considerations are integrated into 
economic and other development plans, programmes and projects, and that 
development needs are taken into account in applying environmental objectives 
(the principle of integration).94   
 
All four components of the sustainable development principle are of relevance for 
REDD+ policy. REDD+ seeks to ensure that forest resources are preserved for the 
benefit of future generations. In addition, as REDD+ is a form of a mitigation activity, 
the initiative also seeks to ensure that dangerous interference with the climate system 
is also avoided. While it is difficult to create specific rights for future generations, a 
REDD+ instrument should recognise that future generations have interests associated 
with forest areas.  
The principle of sustainable use in respect of forest areas should borrow from 
existing sustainable forest management frameworks. Such frameworks include the 
criteria and indicator processes associated with sustainable forest management, 
sustainable management standards from forest certifying bodies and forest 
management methodologies used in payment for ecosystem service market 
mechanisms.95   
Intra-generational considerations are particularly pertinent for REDD+ 
investments. Intra-generational equity can examine equity issues between nations and 
equity issues within nations. When considering equity issues among nations in respect 
of REDD+, consideration must be directed towards—the opportunity cost forgone by 
host REDD+ governments. When considering equity within nations—vulnerable 
groups such as indigenous groups, women, youth and groups without formal tenure 
rights should be recognised as groups requiring protection during REDD+ investment.  
The principle of integration requires for environmental considerations to be taken 
into account in economic and development activities. Sustainable forest management 
needs to be incorporated into broader economic and development policies. There is 
also a real need for integration of REDD+ governance at the international level. The 
lack of a legally binding process means that there are a range of bodies creating 
REDD+ rules and processes. Such bodies include the UN REDD, FCPF of the World 
Bank and Voluntary Carbon Market verifying bodies. The development of a legally 
binding REDD+ instrument will assist in providing clarity on the scope and role of 
REDD+ initiatives and this process could be used to integrate existing institutional 
approaches to REDD+.    
																																																								
94 Sands, supra note 34, at 253. 
95 For further information on these definitional processes see: Rowena MAGUIRE, Global Forest 
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5. Free, Prior and Informed Consent  
A legally binding REDD+ instrument must uphold existing rights protected by 
UNDRIP and in particular the requirements of FPIC (full, prior and informed 
consent).96 The wording within the current REDD+ COP safeguards requiring “full 
and effective participation” is a lower standard to fulfill than FPIC. Full and effective 
participation, does not ensure that prior approval is given by indigenous groups before 
REDD+ activities commence, nor does it ensure that the indigenous group has 
provided consent at any stage for the REDD+ activity to occur. It is suggested that 
there are three types of consent relevant to REDD+ projects: consent to discuss the 
idea for a REDD+ project that will affect community forests; consent to participate in 
developing a detailed plan for a project and consent to the implementation of the 
project.97 As Anderson notes:  
 
“FPIC is a right. It is not a linear process that ends with the signing of an agreement by the 
community. By recognizing the right of indigenous peoples and local communities to be treated 
as the owners and managers of their customary territory, FPIC guarantees them a decisive voice 
at every stage of development planning and implementation for projects that affect them.”98  
 
D. Safeguards 
A just and equitable legally binding REDD+ instrument will include solid safeguard 
protections for indigenous and local forest communities. Safeguards will need to 
address issues of land tenure and or customary land rights and provide some guidance 
as to how REDD+ is to be implemented within different tenure/land holdings. 
Insecure and or conflicting land rights claims over project sites have the potential to 
undermine REDD+ investments. It is therefore of crucial significance that future 
safeguard policy directly deal with land tenure issues so as to ensure that REDD+ 
investment does not cause any unintended consequences (for example displacement 
of people or severe livelihood implications).   
As discussed within the policy and practice of REDD+ component of this article, 
there are a range of existing safeguard policies. These existing safeguard policies 
provide a useful basis for the development of future legally binding safeguard policy.  
Some existing safeguard policies employ the language of justice. For example, the 
UN REDD Social and Environmental Safeguards require the promotion and support 
for the rule of law and access to justice.99 Access to justice is defined largely as 
procedural justice considerations including: legal protection, legal awareness, legal 
aid and counsel, adjudication, enforcement and oversight (parliaments, national 
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human rights commissions). The same safeguards also require the application of the 
principles of democratic governance defined as equity, fairness, consensus, 
coordination, efficiency, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, responsiveness, 
participation and rule of law.      
 
E. Remedial Justice—Grievance Mechanisms 
Theories of remedial justice attempt to construct just outcomes by seeking to ensure 
that a remedy is provided when a wrong has been suffered.100 While it is important to 
minimise REDD-related risks and avoid adverse impacts from the outset, a legally 
binding REDD+ instrument must define a process for resolving disputes or grievances 
that may arise during or as a result of REDD+ investment. The FCPF defines a 
grievances mechanism as  
 
 “a process for receiving and facilitating resolution of queries and grievances from affected 
communities or stakeholders related to REDD-plus activities, policies or programs at the level 
of the community or country. Typically, these mechanisms focus on flexible problem solving 
approaches to dispute resolution through options such as fact finding, dialogue, facilitation or 
mediation, but ‘are not substitutes for legal or administrative systems or other public or civic 
mechanisms’, and ‘do not remove the right of complainants to take their grievances to other 
more formal recourse options’”.101 
 
Disputes and grievances in the REDD+ context may take place between a number 
of different stakeholders. These include (1) conflict between neighbors, (2) conflict 
within families, (3) conflict with creditors, (4) conflict between villagers and local 
authorities, (5) conflict between local jurisdictions, (6) conflict involving state 
institutions, and (7) conflict between villagers and private individuals and 
companies.102 According to the Center for International Environmental Law, existing 
protections in international obligations are not sufficient to ensure that rights of forest 
dependent people are protected during REDD+ investments.103 As such, it is essential 
that a legally binding REDD+ instrument create a grievance mechanism specifically 
designed to deal with the types of conflict likely to arise in REDD+ processes.    
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V. CONCLUSION 
The future of the REDD+ initiative is uncertain, and there is no certainty that a legally 
binding instrument will emerge in the short term. Despite this, REDD+ has played a 
positive role in raising awareness and interest in the sustainable management of 
forests. The level of finance that the REDD+ initiative has generated is unparalleled 
in terms of international funds for sustainable forest management. This increase in 
funding and interest in enhancing and preserving global forest stocks has however not 
been without controversy. This article has shown that the language of justice has 
entered the international REDD+ process. REDD+ is being perceived as an issue of 
justice due to the link between a human action (investment in carbon) and harm as a 
result of that action (forest communities facing land restriction, displacement or 
minimal financial or other gain as a result of REDD+ investment). This article has 
shown that there are a range of different justice theories, rights based paradigms and 
social movements that construe REDD+ justice in different ways. There will never be 
consensus on the most appropriate theory to define justice and REDD+. This article 
instead took a practical focus and identified some key ingredients that should be 
considered when drafting a just and equitable legally binding REDD+ instrument. 
These include examining the nature and form (market versus fund-based) of the 
agreement, articulating a clear objective for the agreement, ensuring that a future 
agreement includes relevant international environmental principles and providing 
machinery for the resolution of grievances that may arise during REDD+ investment. 
The success of the REDD+ initiative will be judged upon its ability to engage forest 
stakeholders at the international, national and sub-national levels and through this 
engagement to change forest management practices. It is suggested that seeking 
engagement with these stakeholders will be more successful when they perceive the 
initiative to be just and equitable and in both design and implementation.     
